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Trauma and Public Memory in Central Asia:
Public responses to political violence of the state policies in Stalinist Era 
in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan
Timur DADABAEV*
Central Asian (CA) states obtained their independence and statehood with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. This was the starting point for many in CA region to re-interpret the events of 
the past and attempt to construct new histories of their own newly independent republics. In 
many cases, these re-constructed histories re-interpret historical events and offer insights into 
histories from the perspectives which are aimed to oppose the Soviet historical discourses, 
which used to dominate history books in CA region for many decades.
Political violence and the state policies of Stalinist era (such as collectivization, 
deportation of ethnic groups and others) can serve as an appropriate example of such 
difference in historical discourses of Soviet and post-Soviet times. While Soviet 
historiography described the events of collectivization and displacement of people as the 
state policy, which was painful yet unavoidable and necessary for the development of the 
country, the post-Soviet discourse on these issues suggests that these were the policies of 
colonization and in some cases of genocide of CA peasantry and intelligentsia in order to 
control these republics. However, both of these polar perspectives do not always accurately 
reflect on how ordinary citizens regarded these issues at that time. There is a lack of input 
on how ordinary people remember the times and policies of Stalinist era and on how those 
policies and approaches affected their everyday life. That is not to say that these public 
memories alone can provide full and impartial picture of the situation of the public responses 
to the Stalinist era policies regarding collectivization, political participation, religion and 
ethnicity.1 They represent “another venue of memory and identity transmission […] operated 
simultaneously and competitively with history,” which may and indeed need to be contrasted 
and counterchecked against archival data and other sources [Crane, 1997: 1372]. In this sense, 
any discussion of how state policies and traumatic experiences of the past have influenced 
formation of current political systems in CA purely based on “official” historical accounts 
and “master narratives” without oral recollections of those times by individuals is incomplete 
and often inadequate. In Post-Soviet and in particular, Central Asian context, it is this “living 
history that perpetuates and renews itself through time and permits the recovery of many old 
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1 For critical review of oral history methods, see an interesting analysis by [Kansteiner 2002].
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currents that have seemingly disappeared.”2
What was the effect of the Stalinist-era policies on the people’s everyday lives in 
CA region? How do people remember and evaluate these impacts? How are these impacts 
evaluated in contemporary times? These are the questions that this paper will attempt to 
answer throughout its main parts.
Structure of the paper
This paper firstly describes the main agricultural and other policies of the Stalinist era and 
highlights how these policies affected lives of ordinary people. It also uses public recollections 
of certain historical events and happenings in everyday life of ordinary people to demonstrate 
how public memory is shaping public attitudes towards political structure, government and their 
own participation in the politics. It then connects many political decisions of the Soviet period 
of Stalin years to the traumatic experiences endured by the populations of CA region. This in 
turn produced certain public responses identified in this paper as differentiated compliance, 
compromise and “silent resistance” on the part of the public in respect to political decisions.
This paper will attempt to demonstrate this through the analysis of the public memory 
in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan regarding political practices (repressions, administration of 
things, etc.), economic policies (collective farm formation, industrialization, economic cadre 
education, etc.), social life (forms and shapes of community and religious life in the Soviet 
times) of Stalin’s period. 
Methodology applied
As a methodological tool, this paper uses the memories of the people’s Soviet time everyday 
experiences collected during the project of the “Memory of the past” (co-organized by the 
Universities of Tokyo, University of Tsukuba, World Economy and Diplomacy in Tashkent 
and Turkish-Kyrgyz Manas University in Bishkek) over the period of 2005 to 2008 in 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The project aimed to use the recordings of the memories of 
everyday life in Soviet CA and where appropriate, relate those to the official recordings of 
history. The project targeted ordinary people (implying those not connected to the party and 
political elite) of the 75 years of age and over with questions regarding their everyday life 
experiences in the various period of their lives. The choice of the everyday life experiences 
of people as the main focus of this study is considered to be one of those instances which 
presents relatively apolitical picture of the societal life of that time, which was largely ignored 
in Soviet and post-Soviet studies. In addition, the information provided by the interviewed in 
the older age group represents a unique data which, if not collected and properly recorded, can 
2 Maurice Halbwachs, Collective Memory, cited in [Crane 1997: 1377].
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be lost in near future due to aging of those who experienced Soviet life-style. The loss of such 
data will result in false interpretations, assumptions and speculations without an opportunity 
to check these historical claims against the reality of everyday lives of that time.
1.  Stalinist policy perspectives
Russian revolution and public in CA
Among the number of changes in the modern history of CA, Russian October revolution 
of 1917, revolution in Russian Turkistan of 1918 and consequent delimitation of the region 
into the Union republics all made significant impact on the CA populations’ life-styles and 
mentality. Prior to these events, CA was divided dominantly into city-states ruled by Khans 
and Emirs and oasis steps mainly populated by nomads.
With Russian penetration of CA in 1865 and its increasing influence on the major city-
states like Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand and steps populated by Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Turkmen 
nomadic tribes, region gradually became the area of Russian domination culminating in its 
being named as Turkistan territory under the administration of Russian-appointed Turkistan 
General Governorship. With the revolution of 1917 in Russia, the situation changed and these 
changes predetermined the development of CA for further decades.
Events of 1917 in Russia have brought both confusion and excitement to many in the 
CA region. With the first bourgeoisie revolution of 1917 in Russia, many hoped for various 
freedoms which would allow for a wide public participation in the process of decision making.
The changes brought by the second revolution of October of 1917 and birth of the 
Lenin-led and Communist Soviet administration emphasized the domination of proletariat 
and peasantry while aiming to establish the Soviet administration out of those who the 
Communist party considered to be exploited and taken advantage of under the previous 
Tsarist administration.
These drastic changes in the society on the one hand brought about the high expectations 
from general public that the discrimination based on racial, ethnic and religious stereotypes 
would disappear and that these changes would bring about freedom and prosperity for general 
public.
However, the evaluation of these events differed depending on social and other 
backgrounds of people. One group of those who opposed previous monarchy-centered 
administration of things in CA region moderately greeted the changes, which were brought by 
the Russian revolution and consequent events. As one example of such a group, one can use 
the case of group of intellectuals referred to as Jadids.3 Many of them were educated abroad 
3 For detailed study of Jadid movement in Central Asia, see [Khalid 1999].
111
Trauma and Public Memory in Central Asia
(outside of CA) and strongly opposed the tyranny of the rulers and lack of public participation 
into political affairs in CA. At the same time, they also criticized Russian imperial colonialism 
and those regional administrations, which accepted such colonialism and advanced its 
policies. These people were excited by changes brought by revolutions in the region and 
hoped to see CA region change for better.
However, there were also those who opposed such changes. Those opposed to the 
Soviet administration received substantial support from the former upper-classes and formed 
brigades, which started the military residence throughout the region. One example of such 
groups was the Bosmachi movement which regarded itself as liberators and was referred to as 
bandits by the Soviet administration.
As a result of such post-revolutionary situation, the general public was confused and 
placed in between the two major forces, one of which supported rule of working class and 
another one, advanced the ideas of preservation of old administration, power structures, 
traditions, life-styles and norms of the society. This puzzled situation is reflected in the 
interview below:
In the aftermath of the revolution our village was divided into “reds [communists]” 
and qurboshi [resistance leaders] and we [ordinary people] were sandwiched 
between them. Those who opposed revolutionaries became qurboshi and they 
both fought each other. However, there was no cohesion and trust even between 
qurboshi who were supposed to be fighting for the same ideas together.
In the entrance of our village, there was a house of Aliyor Qurboshi who 
attempted to protect the railroad [which was important for his own private 
business]. But his protection of the railroad was considered by other qurboshi to 
be an act of betrayal as they considered Aliyor to be favoring “reds.” He was killed 
and his corpse was thrown into the river.
When my grandmother remembers events of that time, she thinks of that time 
as the worst possible one. Qurboshi would come to the village and they will leave 
their tired horses and take the horses of villagers. “Reds” would come and do the 
same. As a result the kolkhoz [agricultural collective farm], which was formed in 
our village, was left with no horses at the end because of such rivalry and anti-
public behavior of each side.
New Economic policy and reform of economy
One of the points emphasized by the new Soviet administration was the re-distribution of 
wealth among the population by confiscating the property and goods of those who earned 
them by exploiting others and re-distributing these to those who belonged to the working class 
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and peasantry. This was especially so in the first years after the revolution when the reserves 
of food stock were limited and insufficient to provide for the needs of the whole population. 
This culminated in the policy which was referred to as “politics of military communism” one 
feature of which was prodrazverstka (confiscation of food stock from population for the needs 
of the government) and prodnalog (tax to be paid in food-stock by everyone who owned any 
food-stock production capacity). Although as stated above, the policies were aimed at re-
distributing and balancing the food-stock provision, it has turned into a total confiscation of 
any available food-stock reserves of population mainly due to the wrong interpretation of the 
policy and very ambiguous criteria about who is to be targeted by this policy. This policy had 
a number of negative implications not only for economy and well-being of citizens but also 
for the Soviet administration in general especially in the years of 1920–1921 when this policy 
was implemented using the means of enforcement. These were the years when the legitimacy 
and authority of the Soviet administration was increasingly questioned and led to the public 
discontent with its outcomes.
As a result, Soviet authorities had to correct their policies and introduce the new notion 
of New Economic Policy (NEP) which would allow for a greater degree of freedom for those 
engaged in production of food stock and small enterprises. Accordingly, this policy loosened 
the regulations of the food-stock tax and offered a greater advantage to those engaged in 
small and medium size entrepreneurship. This policy had three main goals. The first policy-
related goal was to bridge an increasing gap in living standards between working class and 
peasantry. The second goal was related to the economic objective of stopping the slide 
in the living standards of population in general. And the third objective aimed at creating 
social environment in which society would accept the main assumptions of socialist type of 
economy. In this sense, the NEP policy was not so much a response to the concerns of the 
population but it aimed more to divert and decrease the level of dissatisfaction with the Soviet 
authorities and their economic policy.
Collectivization and its features
Another policy of the Soviet government in the initial years of its existence was the policy 
of the collectivization. The main idea behind this policy was that it was more productive 
and efficient to unite scarce resources and tools of production of individual farmers to create 
larger agricultural associations which will then increase the efficiency of production and 
the level of their well-being. For this purpose, the land, tools of production, livestock, seeds 
and other related possessions of the farmers were brought into one and composed into new 
collective farms. In those areas where rich farmers did not want to join in, their lands and 
 For details, see [Shamsutdinov 2001; 2003].
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tools of production were often confiscated by the state and they themselves declared as 
enemies of the people. As is the case with prodrazverstka, the criteria for confiscating the 
land and creating collective farms were unclear, while the objective of uniting plots of land 
and tools of production always dominated the political agenda.
Among the collective farms, three types were attributed special importance: “cooperatives 
for common use of land”(towarischestva po sovmestnoi obrabotke zemli), artels and 
communes. The difference between the three was regarding the land ownership rights. 
Cooperatives were supposed to unite the land plots of members and through common labor 
produce food stocks. However, in the case of cooperatives, the tools (except for livestock like 
horses, cows, etc.) of production could remain in private hands.5
Artels were the associations of farmers which were supposed to unite not only the land 
plots but also all the means of production, except for private housing, yard and small animals. 
Communes incorporated in themselves all the properties including land spots, housing, 
animals and all the possessions. In the communes the labor was supposed to be conducted by 
all members and the products were sold out to the state. The amount of produced food stock, 
which exceeded the amount to be sold out to the state, was then divided into and distributed to 
the number of people composing the commune.
In the aftermath of the October revolution, communes and artels were the dominating 
type of agricultural production units with their number reaching 18,000 for the whole USSR 
[Shamsutdinov et al. 2005].6 However, under the influence of the NEP policy, the number of 
communes and artels decreased significantly with the collective farms (kolkhozes) becoming 
the dominating form of agricultural production.
In 1927, the XV Congress of the All-Russia Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted the 
document on the usage and redistribution of land which favored collective farms over other 
forms of agricultural associations. In addition, the same document stipulated the notion of 
kulaks which was meant to refer to those upper and middle-class individuals who resisted and 
prevented creation of the collective farms. The land plots, property and tools of production 
of those considered to be kulaks were confiscated in favor of the government and later 
redistributed into various collective farms.
In addition to collective farms, from November of 1928, the policy of creating Vehicle 
and Machine Stations was practiced when majority of production tools were taken together 
and commonly utilized. Such common tools of production and common labor were considered 
to lower its costs and increase its efficiency.
Above that, in 1928, the collectivization initiatives further intensified and in addition 
to private land spots previously used for agricultural production, the lands spots used for 
5 Evidence of this can be found in many sources such as [Shamsutdinov et al. 2005].
6 For details, see [Shamsutdinov 2003].
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individual yards were also absorbed into collective farms, thus provoking further displeasure 
of not only individual members of collective farms who opposed collectivization from the 
beginning of the process but also even those who were initially tolerant to it. From this time, 
many started paralleling the policies of collectivization with those of colonization practiced 
by Tsarist Russia in CA region.
But these voices of concern of general public remained largely ignored by the Soviet 
authorities. On the contrary, the Soviet government intensified its policy of collectivization 
and on January 5, 1930, approved the VKPb Central Committee’s document on the measures 
to promote collectivization which envisaged various punitive measures in respect to those 
who preferred not to participate in the collective farms. These included various measures such 
as depriving election rights and the right to be in the leadership positions. In addition to these 
measures, the dekulakization policy (raskulachivanie) was applied which implied that those 
who did not voluntarily contribute to the development of collective farms by giving up all 
of their animal and food stocks were considered to be kulak and to have anti-governmental 
stance. Many of such people were sent out to the Siberia and never returned back to their own 
places of residence.
2.  The traumas of collectivization
The biggest implication of the collectivization for many in CA was the traumatic impact that it 
made by incurring human losses and damage to social status of those involved, imprisonment 
of a large number of people and psychological pressure for many ordinary citizens who once 
and for many years remembered the outcomes of the enforced agricultural reforms. These 
traumatic experiences also influenced everyday lives, life style and the way people related 
themselves to the public policy. Therefore, in Uzbekistan where the majority of population 
consists of the rural population and in Kyrgyzstan which used to have largely nomadic 
populations, this agricultural policy has a special importance.
While the reform of agricultural sector and collectivization was initiated for the purpose 
of alleviating the poverty and improving the production capacity of the small producers by 
uniting their resources, public reacted to these policies differently depending on their own 
social and other backgrounds. From the recollections of respondents one can assume existence 
of at least three types of reactions to the collectivization: those advancing and accepting it; 
those rejecting it all together; and those respondents who could not decide on their attitudes 
towards collectivization and were left largely confused by it.
By mid 1930s, a large number of people faced a reality of collectivization with several 
choices: to follow the Soviet authorities in their policy of collectivization, oppose and be 
repressed or leave the country all together.
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Advancing and accepting collectivization
The policy of collectivization was aimed to protect the part of the population which was 
considered to be the most vulnerable and economically weak. It was for this purpose that their 
land plots which were considered to be difficult for them to manage and their limited tools 
of production were united. They were also given an opportunity to work together providing a 
larger workforce thus limiting the burden fallen on each individual family. Therefore, those 
belonging to the poor peasantry accepted this policy with enthusiasm. Many of these people 
in the Tsarist time would have to work for rich peasants in order to feed their families. They 
saw collectivization as an opportunity to jointly own the land spots and jointly develop it. For 
them, such policies were considered to be liberating from the dependency on those who used 
to employ them on disadvantageous conditions. These people felt excited by such reform.
One significant social change of the collectivization was that it called upon the joint 
labor of women and men on the same conditions and in the same land plots. This was a drastic 
change from the pre-revolutionary practices when women were not allowed to work and they 
had to work at home for most of the time. Although the involvement of women at the first 
stages of collectivization was limited and mainly dominated by Russian or Russia-educated 
local women, the fact that collectivization called for the equal participation of women in labor 
and equal opportunities disregarding the gender added some public support to the process of 
collectivization. The following interview is very symbolic of the time:
At that time, both urban and rural people suffered economically. My mother 
was activist of the collectivization movement and she would travel across wide 
territories to spread the most efficient seeds and explain how to take care of them 
in order to have a good harvest. But at that time, there were certain anti-Soviet 
forces in the rural areas and they once followed my mother and attempted to catch 
her. Although my mother was Russian, she spoke equally well in Uzbek language 
and that is why local people liked her and when needed they provided a place for 
her to hide from those following her. And this was not the only time this happened. 
However, the fact that many people accepted and even advanced the collectivization policies 
did not imply that they were immune to the traumas of this process. As demonstrated in 
the interview below, although certain people welcomed the process of collectivization and 
voluntarily entered the artel, they were still discriminated against because of the suspicion of 
the anti-governmental activity. 
My father used to have 12 cows and two horses in his possession. When the 
process of collectivization has started, he voluntarily entered artel where he worked 
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ever since. Nevertheless, he was continuously suspected of being anti-Soviet in 
his views. A criminal case has been launched against him during, which he was 
prescribed to stay inside his house in Bukhara. He protested vigorously against 
such treatment. I remember him saying that we gave everything to the artel and we 
even worked there as a family. Despite such contribution, we were still suspected. 
At the end, he stopped taking food in protest of his treatment and in 10 days his 
health deteriorated and he died soon after that. 
The implementation of collectivization has been supervised by those dispatched from the 
governmental institutions to instruct on the details. It was these people who often interpreted 
the general policy according to their own understanding, which resulted in irregularities and 
lack of cohesion in its implementation. This was especially so, when the issue of criteria 
for whom to consider to be kulak and anti-Soviet element was concerned. Very often those 
officials dispatched to the rural areas and who were charged with overseeing the process, 
interpreted in their own terms the notions of collectivization and what it meant to be kulak
or anti-Soviet element. This type of confusion and freedom in interpretations which was 
rarely reflected in the official archived documents appears in a number of recollections and 
interviews as exemplified by the interview below. 
My father was governmental official responsible for advancing the process of 
collectivization in 1920s. Part of his work was also to deal with the rich famers 
who used to be called kulaks and confiscate their properties. Once, just out of 
curiosity, I asked him “what was the criteria that you used to determine who is 
kulak?” He said that it was all ambiguous but if one had 10 to 15 goats and 5 to 6 
cows, there is no doubt that this is rich person who needed to be considered kulak.
While there is such diversity in evaluation of collectivization, a great number of those 
who accepted it opted to emphasize its positive sides. They agreed with the rationale of the 
collectivization and considered the importance of redistribution of wealth, enlarging the sizes 
of land plots for the better land usage efficiency, joint purchase and usage of equipment and 
government support of the agricultural producers to be crucially important issues for the 
developing of agriculture. Therefore, while admitting the problems and issues relating to the 
process of advancing collectivization they still believed it was the right way to proceed as is 
explained in the interview below. 
Simply put, collectivization was about taking the land and seeds from rich peasants 
and concentrating these in the kolkhozes. Kolkhozes also acquired horses and 
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donkeys in the same manner. Although the time was a very hard one, such process 
was important to facilitate the system which made it possible to provide [wealth] 
for many poor peasants. I think there is a lot of criticism of the collectivization 
process but I do not have an intention to criticize it [from current position].
Imposing collectivization
As shown above, in the conditions when there were no clear conditions for defining whose 
land needs to be privatized and who is the person resisting the collectivization, the process 
was progressing very slowly and with a big number of various problems. Naturally, those 
who had lands in their possessions and those who suffered from irregularities in this process 
regarded it negatively and attempted to resist it. While collectivization was first considered 
to be a voluntary process, it turned into a compulsory one especially in certain areas, which 
were defined as areas of “total collectivization.” The Soviet administration first called upon 
those who had more property and tools of production to join in into collective farms. If people 
refused to do so, the process of dekulakization has been launched against them. Their property 
and tools of production were confiscated in favor of the state and contributed to the collective 
farms while the owners were announced to be enemies of the state and applied administrative 
and criminal punitive measures. The term kulak has been introduced which in Russian 
language means a “feast” and implies someone who grabbed something and does not want to 
give it to anyone away. The targets of the punitive measures mentioned above were not only 
kulaks but also the members of their families. Even those who were not targeted by enforced 
collectivization have also been requested to contribute their belongings for the collective 
good. Therefore, the process of collectivization covered substantially all the belongings that 
individual households had. According to one account, 
Goats, cows, donkeys, horses were all confiscated and considered to be a 
collective farm’s property. As if that was not enough, they introduced the system 
which implied that if you had a tree in your backyard and if that tree produced 
any fruits, one had to pay the tax for that as well. If one produced fat and meat 
in the household for household’s usage that was also taxed. At the end, they 
even introduced the taxes charged based on the number of people one had in the 
household.
There were even few instances, when the same person has been dekulakized for more 
than once. Those who wanted to preserve their food stock ended up burying it into the land 
and hide it that way. That is why officials responsible for confiscation of food stocks would 
come to their houses for several times in the day and night time to check if they had anything 
118
Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies 3-1 (July 2009)
left, as is in the case below. 
My grandfather has been targeted for three times. Every time officials responsible 
for the process would come to his house and take everything he had with them. My 
grandmother used to cheer up my grandfather by saying that they would still be 
able to re-acquire everything. When my grandfather was finally arrested, we with 
my grandmother used to visit him in prison but clerks would allow only children to 
go inside and see our grandfather. When we would enter the prison, there he was 
standing in a large yard and opening his hands to hug us. Because our grandmother 
was not allowed to see him, she would put a note under my hat and that is the way 
she communicated with him. 
Because of this kind of treatment, a great number of people had very complicated 
feelings about the process of collectivization. This also resulted in the protests and the feeling 
of rejection of the process all together. This was especially so among those who, prior to the 
establishment of Soviet administration, already achieved certain success in their business and 
had some property which was forcefully collectivized by the Soviet authorities. They were 
termed as “bays”(rich).
Interestingly, even if they voluntarily contributed their property to collective farms, they 
were still refused membership in the collective farms, forcing them to leave their places of 
residence. These situations were observed with puzzle not only by those who were applied 
these policies but also by members of collective farms. They, on some occasions, called for 
dissolution of such exclusive collective farms or called for an inclusion of the former bays and 
kulaks into collective farms. Because, in many cases, the members of collective farms were 
not necessarily peasants and because the methods and techniques of agricultural cultivation 
were not always available to collective farms, their production efficiency fell significantly, 
especially in the first years of collectivization resulting in hunger throughout the CA region. 
Majority of those collective farms formed on the basis of the collectivization did not 
have experience of functioning as one production unit and were largely involved in the 
cultivating fresh vegetables and fruits with little or no experience of cotton production. 
Despite such lack of experience, many of these newly created agricultural enterprises were 
forced to cultivate cotton because of the favorable international market for it and increasing 
needs in the internal Soviet market. The enforcement of cotton cultivation can also be traced 
through looking into the folklore such as songs of the time which praised cotton production 
(extract from a song says: Cotton, cotton, cotton, there is nothing better than it!)7
7 From recollection of Abdukhamid Kochar who ran from Soviet authorities to Afghanistan and later 
settled in Turkey, in  [Shakhnazarov 2008 (May 29)].
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Because of such total collectivization and enforced cotton production, the dissatisfaction 
with the Soviet administration increased and very frequently turned into violent resistance to 
the officials. In such situations, red army was called upon to enforce the political will of the 
Soviet authorities in the localities of fierce resistance. There were even cases reported when in 
the peasants in the collective farm would get together to the meeting of the kolkhoz and decide 
on the dissolution of the collective farm with the lands and tools of production returned to the 
original owners, as also testified in the interview below.
Our family was a very average family in our village. Our father worked at the 
factory and mother was working as a peasant. When the collectivization has 
started, our livestock was taken to the collective farm and we had nothing left in 
our yard. Our life became very difficult. I had a younger sister who was 10 years 
younger than I am and she was doing most of the things in the household. But one 
day, we learnt that collective farm could not secure the food stock for the animals. 
For that period, members decided to dissolve the kolkhoz and return the animals to 
original owners for the sake of preservation. In a short time, when our cows were 
returned to us, our life became much easier and better. 
Later however, Soviet authorities would arrive in the kolkhoz and would forcefully 
call for a meeting in which they would re-install the kolkhoz administration and collectivize 
the land and tools of production again. This was very often observed in the areas where the 
Soviet administration used total collectivization techniques when all the property of residents 
at once (disregarding the social status and economic conditions of each family) became the 
property of the kolkhoz and when all residence at once became the workers of the kolkhoz
without enquiring for the views and intentions of these people. Resistance to such methods 
was fiercely and forcefully prevented by Soviet authorities as is narrated in the following 
interview.
Right before the revolution, my grandfather had bought a land of 4,000ha which 
he did not want to divide into smaller plots for each of his children. He wanted to 
manage these lands as one piece in a possession of our family. Because of such 
huge land in a possession of one family, we were regarded as kulaks and our land, 
home and everything else have been confiscated. My father moved from that area 
and that is why he survived because nobody knew his past in the new area where 
he ended up living. However, my uncle remained in the area of his residence and 
he was treated really badly by Soviet authorities. There was a sign in his passport 
saying that he is “Son of Kulak” and that “All citizen rights are withdrawn.” 
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The case above is one example of how repressions against those resisting or considered 
to be resisting Soviet state were implemented. Yet people were still trying to deal with them 
at the everyday life level which at times took some comical forms as the case below. 
When my father came to Tashkent, he had a document certifying him which has 
included the sign “All citizen rights are withdrawn” because he was coming out of 
the family of the kulak. When he came to Tashkent, relatives started thinking of 
what they can do with that sign because unless deleted or changed, it could become 
the problem for my father’s new life. The way out of this situation they found 
was to find a pen of the same color and add to the words “All citizen right are 
withdrawn” a part “not” so that it would read “All citizen right are not withdrawn.” 
As a result, mainly because of the chaos of that time with the documents, my father 
never had problems with his documents and peacefully lived his whole life in 
Tashkent.
The responses of people at the everyday level to the state’s enforcement and violence 
were different depending on their living environment. However, the feeling of enforcement of 
something which people resisted in their heart created hidden trauma which people got used 
to but still could not accept. As is depicted by respondent below, 
The collectivization process progressed very slowly and with many difficulties. 
Everybody around me considered this process to be a lawless confiscating of the 
land by the government and lawless usage of that land. However, as economy 
moved forward gradually, people got used to the situation. They never accepted 
it as it is and it always appeared in their memories, but for the sake of practicality 
they gave up on the idea of [resisting] kolkhozes [and reinstating their land 
ownership].
Although collectivization produced a great number of negative outcomes and resulted 
in the situation when the efficiency of agriculture decreased, creating hunger of 1930s, it later 
produced some positive outcomes as government strengthened its support to the collective 
farms and assisted in equipping and obtaining the seeds. Some economic progress which was 
seen in the CA agricultural sectors in later years when the collectivization started producing 
some outcomes positively affected lives of people and many preferred to avoid reference to 
the traumas of collectivization by then. Although these traumas were not forgotten, they were 
not referred and very often people preferred not to recollect the excesses of these events. 
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Escaping the collectivization
There were a number of people who choose to oppose the Soviet administration of things in 
general and Soviet collectivization policy in particular through violent struggle. Therefore, 
they formed paramilitary units referred by Soviet authorities as “bosmachi” (literally 
translated as oppressor) headed by leaders referred to as “kurbashi.” They staged military 
resistance to the Red Army throughout the region. These units included many people who 
lost their properties to the Soviet administration and were eager to regain it back. In order to 
make their voices heard, these units would commit various violent acts against both Soviet 
administration and ordinary civilian population. 
The Soviet authorities also used the Red Army and other law enforcement units to 
counteract these moves. As a result, ordinary people were caught up in between the two forces 
and many of them were then drawn into the civil war. Those who were caught by Red Army 
and those suspected of support to resistance movement were then sent to Siberia and Russia 
as well as Ukraine where they were placed into the working camps and collective farms. 
For instance according to one recollection, those sent to the Ukraine were forced to cultivate 
cotton which was not very suitable for the conditions of Ukraine. 
Among ordinary citizens, many preferred to flee Soviet CA to the neighboring 
Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey or China. For instance, because there were a number of Uzbeks, 
Tajik, Turkmen and other groups residing in Afghanistan, many considered Afghanistan as a 
suitable place to flee. According to the interviews of those who flew to Afghanistan, many of 
the Central Asians who ran to Afghanistan were referred to as new Turkistanies. The official 
statistics show that the population of the territory of the Bukhara Emirate decreased from 
1,374,685 people in 1917 to 831,180 people in 1926. Partly this decrease can be explained by 
the number of people who flew these territories.8
Those fleeing civil war and Soviet repressions could not freely trespass the Soviet border 
with Afghanistan. They therefore, needed to find an intermediary party to negotiate their 
trespassing with and bribe Soviet and Afghan border-guards. According to the statements of 
those who went through the border, they had to negotiate not the right to cross the border by 
land but the opportunity to cross it through the river by bribing border-guards and asking them 
to turn blind eyes on those who were crossing the river illegally. They had to pay both to the 
border-guards and intermediary brokers for their “services.” However, even if they succeeded 
in their negotiations, this did not mean that they could successfully cross into Afghanistan 
as they had to cross the river, which was a dangerous endeavor of its own as indicated in the 
interview below. 
8 For data cited, see [Shakhnazarov 2008 (May 29)].
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“[…] Finally we closed to the river and I started making the plot out of the leather 
of the 12 cows with the leg parts of leather tightly tied to each other. We spent 24
hours for this. When the plot was ready we put women and our belongings on it, 
tied it to the tail of a horse, while ourselves [men] were hanged on it from three 
sides and started swimming. We swam for 10–15 minutes in the water and we were 
all trembling both from the freezing water and from the fear that we will be shot 
dead by border-guards.”9
Once on the Afghan side, they were apprehended by the Afghan border-guards and taken to 
the city. They were not issued any documents but were given houses where they could live. 
Yet, many managed to negotiate with the Afghan governmental clerks and get documents 
issued for them for some money. After that, they moved on to Turkey which was considered 
culturally and geographically to be friendlier living environment than Afghanistan.10
3.  Political repressions and general public 
In order to achieve the goals of economic, political and social reforms, Communist party 
and Soviet government enforced various propaganda campaigns and when those campaigns 
were not effective, it enforced its decisions by various administrative methods. These 
were supposed to send a message to the public that the Soviet government is serious about 
implementing those initiatives which it declared to be the most important for succeeding in 
transition to the new form of Socialist and later Communist society. While it widely used 
the methods of convictions, it initiated punitive measures against those who it regarded to 
be belong to the anti-Soviet elements, in the cases when convictions did not work. These 
included repressions against political opponents, unreliable ethnic groups and religious 
authorities. Such practices translated into societal traumas which later influenced the mentality 
of people at large and the pattern of their political participation. 
The essence of political repressions and its logic
The political repressions were most frequently recorded in the Stalin’s period when the 
process of industrial modernization and agricultural reforms encountered opposition. While 
the period of Stalin’s rule was characterized by many as the period when the industrial and 
agricultural base of the country got shaped, political repressions and harsh punitive methods 
were largely applied both to the political leadership of the country (suspected of having 
9 From recollection of Abdukhamid Kochar who ran from Soviet authorities to Afghanistan and later 
settled in Turkey, in  [Shakhnazarov 2008 (May 29)].
10 From recollection of Abdukhamid Kochar in [Shakhnazarov 2008 (May 29)].
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anti-governmental ideas) and people at large. In addition to people repressed for their real 
or suspected believes, relatives and friends of these people were also subjected to the same 
treatment and sentenced to long periods of imprisonment or death sentence just for being 
associated with suspicious individuals.
As is demonstrated above, the first stage of repressions has started with certain people 
being suspected of opposing Soviet government’s agricultural reform agenda. In their 
majority, these were people declared to be kulaks. Their property has been confiscated by the 
government and most of them were sent off to the labor camps outside of CA (most often to 
Siberia). In addition to this group of people, those convicted of crimes and sentenced to prison 
terms were suspected of being anti-Soviet in their views and these suspicions remained even 
after their release.
In general, Soviet authorities divided the group of repressed into three main groups. 
The first group included people who were considered to be openly and aggressively anti-
Soviet both in their views and their actions. Those falling into this group of people were 
apprehended, tried in troikas (tribunal of three judges without access of attorneys and lawyers) 
and the most frequently sentenced to death sentences in a matter of several hours and in one 
session of hearing. 
The second group consisted of people who were considered to be anti-Soviet in their 
views but who had a potential to change their mind and to improve. They were apprehended and 
sent to various labor camps for 8 to 10 years before having opportunity to be released back 
into society. Soviet authorities not only classified these people into several groups but also 
provided estimates of how many out of general population needed to be potentially arrested 
clearly stipulating the figures. Those in the second group have been as a rule sentenced to 
the heavy labor and sent to the labor camps in Siberia. In many cases, they were also sent 
to the areas of heavy climatic conditions where the labor was especially difficult and where 
ordinary workers would not volunteer to go. In these cases, the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and its branches would address their notes to the local administrations and local branches of 
Communist Party in the areas of heavy climatic conditions with an enquiry about the needs 
of labor and if they responded by requesting labor force of labor camps, people from these 
camps were sent there. 
After the sentences were issued, the troikas handed them over to the Communist Party 
department in Moscow which had to approve the decisions of troikas. In some cases, the 
people from the second group of those to be punished by a less severe punishment were 
moved to the first group of those to be severely punished according to the consideration 
of the Party officials. There were no reported cases, when the decision of the troika has 
been changed in favor of a softer decision. In addition to the department responsible for 
these considerations, the final word on the executions has been made by the Stalin and his 
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surroundings.11
There was a detailed procedure for conducting the interrogations of people who were 
arrested on the suspicion of having anti-Soviet intentions. These procedures were distributed 
to those involved in interrogation in written form and remain as archival documents. The 
instructions would normally start by suggesting that once person is taken into the room for 
interrogation he is to be pressed with the charges aggressively and consistently. At the same 
time, those arrested were offered to write a note of confession to the Communist party and 
request for a tolerance. It was detailed in the interrogation techniques that if arrested person 
refused to write a note, he needed not be let back into his own cell unless he writes a note. For 
that purpose the instruction stipulated having interrogation for several days if needed with 2 
to 3 interrogators changing each other for rest. If arrested person refused to comply, they were 
not given food or forced to sit straight on the chair for very long time in order to force their 
confession. If arrested person agreed to write a confession he was to be given some food or 
tobacco and then gone on with the interrogation until the confession is finally written in detail. 
It was important that the interrogation note taken during the interrogation by interrogators was 
signed personally by arrested. 
The targets for arrests were also selected using a special scheme in which all the 
residents of certain district were enlisted disregarding their social background. These lists 
needed to contain very detailed information about each including their connection to already 
arrested people. The wives of arrested were of special concern to the law enforcement 
authorities as wives very often were forced to cooperate with investigation into their 
husbands’ cases. If they cooperated with authorities they were not arrested but put under 
strict control of the local law enforcement agents until the cases of their husbands are given 
consideration. If they refused to cooperate, they were arrested right away and kept in prison. 
But as a rule, even those who cooperated with an investigation were arrested and sent to the 
camps as soon as their husbands’ verdicts were issued and approved by the Communist Party 
leadership. There were only few exceptions as in the situations when the wives were too old 
to be arrested. Children of those arrested were then separated from the fathers and mothers 
and transferred to the boarding schools for further caretaking.
Once sent to the labor camps, it was a long time before those arrested were entitled 
for release. However the release instructions detailed on the conditions which included the 
stipulation that those being released could not resettle in big cities like Moscow, Minsk, Kiev 
and others. They were also often offered accommodation close to the areas of their labor camp 
detention in order to keep labor forces in those areas and prevent those people from returning 
to the areas of their original residence. 
11 Evidence and detailed analysis of this can be found in many sources such as [Shamsutdinov et al. 
2005: 204–216].
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“Enemies of the state”
Majority of those repressed were considered to be enemies of the state. Those sentenced to 
the labor camps were considered to be given a chance to prove their allegiance to the state 
while those sentenced to death were considered the most dangerous “enemies of the state.” 
Among them, the special attention was paid to people, which belonged to the nationalistic 
intelligentsia and those who resisted Russian-dominated rule. It was enough to re-interpret 
or misunderstand a line in their writings in order for them to be included into the group of 
enemies of the state.
The reasons for these people to be given special attention by Soviet authorities was 
because they had social status and capacity to influence the way of thinking of other through 
their writings and other educational activities. Therefore, Soviet authorities made no 
compromises with this type of people, once they had suspicions about them. 
When collectivization started in 1920s, if you had one cow or horse, you were 
already considered to belong to middle class. There were some people who 
protested such lawlessness but Soviet authorities got rid off of the people who were 
in the center of these protests. For instance, a number of Uzbek intelligentsia such 
as Abdulla Qodiriy, Fitrat, Faizulla Khodzhaev Cholpon, Bekhbudi and others 
were examples of those whom Soviets repressed. For example, Abdulla Qodiri in 
his writing called Obid Ketmon apparently made some kind of (political) “mistake” 
because of which he was punished. My father was placed into the same cell with 
Cholpon. Luckily my father was released, but Cholpon was sentenced to death. 
Aside from writing intelligentsia, those who had an experience of studying abroad were 
also targeted by Soviet authorities because they were considered to be especially unreliable 
because of their connections and experience abroad. They were often considered spies and 
treated accordingly as an enemy of the state.
My father had an experience of studying under the Soviet governments’ 
scholarship about industrial technology in Germany. When he returned back from 
Germany to the University to a teaching position, he was suspected both from 
his colleagues in the University and from the secret police which had its offices 
in the University. When relations of the Soviet Union with Germany worsened, 
the suspicions against my father strengthened and he was arrested on a suspicion 
of being a German spy. Because he was an engineer, he was useful in prison and 
because of his work he was released. However, his brother who was only arrested 
because he was a brother of my father never came back from prison. My father was 
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never taken into Soviet army just because he was considered to be a former enemy 
of the state even in the years of the WWII when the army needed people the most.12
In the 1930s, there were a great number of people who shared such destiny. They were 
arrested and nobody would ever know about their destiny anymore. One example is from the 
interview below. 
I was very young in the Stalin’s period. My parents were working for the factory 
and there was very kind director of that factory who was liked by many. He was 
sincerely interested not only about the working environment of workers but also 
about their living conditions. But one day, he disappeared from the factory without 
any previous information. He was never seen after that and some of the workers 
even looked for him. But they were told by authorities not to have interest in his 
destiny and nobody heard about him ever after that. 
Interestingly however, very few people link these repressions with the personality of 
Stalin. Majority of those asked testified that although it was Stalin who needs to be kept 
responsible for these events as leader of a country, it was not his personal responsibility but 
rather responsibility of those who presented the information to him (Beria and others) in a 
way that he considered it to be serving interests of the nation. Some even suggested that it was 
Beria and his surrounding who needs to be held primarily responsible for these repressions, 
thus taking the guilt off the Stalin’s name. The opinion below is very symbolic of such 
attitude.
My father’s brother was imprisoned between 1939 and 1942 as political prisoner. 
Ever after being released to present day he keeps telling to everyone “I do not 
know who imprisoned me but I am convinced it was not Stalin’s fault that I was 
imprisoned” expressing his respect to Stalin and considering Stalin’s surrounding 
responsible for the atrocities of that time.
Such opinions are very typical for people who experienced Stalin’s rule. They contain 
contradictory notes on the one hand praising Stalin’s tough-hand policies, and on the other 
hand criticizing repressions of that time which they blame not on Stalin but his subordinates. 
Such great respect for Stalin mainly comes from public belief that it was Stalin’s leadership 
that made industrialization and agricultural reforms successful in addition to his strong will 
12 For instance see [Shamsutdinov et al. 2005: 78–79, 84–85].
127
Trauma and Public Memory in Central Asia
and skillful management of USSR’s performance in the WWII. In addition, the well-known 
fact of Stalin’s refusal to exchange his own son imprisoned by German troops for German 
general imprisoned by Soviet troops served as a proof of personal loses that Stalin endured 
personally making his image close to the public. This, in addition to his modest life-style 
and very hard-working character made it difficult for many people to believe that Stalin, as 
individual, was capable of intentionally committing the crimes, repressions and atrocities of 
the scale that were later detailed by historians. These are exemplified by the interview below.
My family [despite the problems of deportation of people and problems of 
collectivization] respects Stalin very much. I believe that because of his leadership 
our life improved by days. I especially remember price decreases which were 
announced for majority of products every March. Therefore many people waited 
until March and only then purchased many products because they were confident 
that every March products became cheaper and cheaper. This added excitement 
and motivation to people as they felt that their lives are getting better and better on 
a daily basis. After a while people got used to this kind of constant improvement of 
the living standards and started relying on a state policy for everything.
Forced deportation and displacement of ethnic groups
In addition to the political prisoners, there was another group of people, who suffered 
significant traumas in the initial years of the formation of the USSR. These are groups 
of forcefully deported and displaced ethnic minorities who were considered by Soviet 
administration to be unreliable and in need to be relocated into the areas where they can 
both be of no harm to the Soviet interests and of help to the economy. This policy of forced 
dislocation of large ethnic groups was applied to many smaller ethnic groups like Volga 
Germans, Tatars, Jews and Meschetian Turks, with Koreans to be later example.13
The policy was to relocate those ethnic groups which were considered to be less reliable 
and less patriotic towards Soviet identity from the areas bordering other countries in order to 
prevent betrayal and separatism.
Therefore, such ethnic groups were deported from the places of their original residence 
and re-located to the Siberia and the Soviet south, including Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and other 
CA states. They were not consulted about this move and very few were given a chance to collect 
their belongings. While in transit, many of them died of the hardships of travel or diseases. When 
they were moved to CA, local population is said to be helping them with their settlement. Yet the 
traumatic experiences of such political move remain fresh in memories of many.
13 For an interesting account of life of Koreans after relocation to Central Asia, see [Ferghana.ru 2007 
(Jul. 30)]; Also see [Kim 1993].
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My parents were moved from Crimea to Uzbekistan in May of 1944. My parents 
had 12 sisters and brothers but when they arrived to Uzbekistan, the only survivors 
were themselves. My parents’ sisters and brothers and parents have all died in 
transit because of catching bad cold and other diseases. When they arrived, they 
were placed in the village called Paranda and they were forbidden to go outside of 
that village.
Local population of Uzbeks helped and was very friendly in general. Their 
own lives were not too sweet at that time but they shared with Tatars everything 
they had. My mother was left completely alone and her first work was to cut the 
trees. She then got a job in the kolkhoz. Since my mother attended 7 classes of 
school, she was treated as an educated person. That allowed her to get a job in the 
boarding school and become a teacher. Because of the nature of her job, I could 
always be with my mother when I was little. She also spent a lot of time working 
because she wanted to do everything to escape from poverty [they were put in by 
the deportation policy]. Because of her hard work, I could graduate from school 
and enter medical technical vocational training school. My brother graduated from 
the Tashkent Technological University. I remember the way we lived our life 
having only one thing in our minds “to live from one day to another and survive.” 
When each day passed we thought “it is so good that today has finished without 
problems.”
A similar account of the life of displaced people was recalled in a different interview, as 
below.
I had a friend of Crimean Tatar. He was brought to Uzbekistan when he was 
very small kid. According to his recollection, when he was brought by train to 
Uzbekistan, they were told to take off the train in the step [deserted] area where 
there was nothing even closely remotely useful for life.
They were left there and train left the area. They were trying to accommodate 
themselves learning about areas around. In several hours of staying there, they saw 
several old people approaching. These were elders of the nearest village who saw 
Tatars un-boarding the train and came to see who they were and why they came 
to this land. This became critical moment for Tatars because these Uzbek elders 
helped Tatars a lot by sharing everything with them. One reason why they managed 
to have good relations was that both Uzbeks and Tatars were Muslims and shared 
common vision of how they should behave in this situation.
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As can be seen from above, the policies in the Stalin’s period identified the ethnic 
groups which could be trusted and those which could not. The latter ones were then re-settled 
to the areas where there was no enough labor supply to alleviate the needs of economy. In the 
new places, these people accommodated themselves as they could. Some started their own 
collective farms, while others worked in various organizations in the areas where they were 
dislocated. There were some other cases, when people were not forcefully resettled but joined 
their own ethnic group for one reason or another, as in the case below. 
We are Crimean Tatars and our father with all of our family members were born 
in Crimea. Only I was born in Uzbekistan after we moved here. The reason for us 
to move to Uzbekistan was that our father was a military person. He committed 
some kind of mistake in his duty and was discharged from the active military 
service and directed to work in the Zangiota [area close to Tashkent] in the camp 
for criminals as officer. In 1936, he moved from Zangiota and in 1953 when the 
charges of misconduct were cleared from him, he left the service as the camp 
officer all together. We remained in Uzbekistan and never moved back [to Russia]. 
My father started working in kolkhoz becoming the tractor driver. After we became 
old enough one of our sisters went to Leningrad Aviation Institute which at that 
time was located in Tashkent [due to the fact that it was moved from Leningrad 
to Tashkent in the years of war] and graduated from it after the war. She then 
moved to Russia and lived there ever since. The younger sister went to study in 
Samarkand State University and after graduating from the history department 
returned to Crimea where she now lives. And I remained in Uzbekistan although 
now I have my family members in Uzbekistan, Russia and Ukraine. This seems a 
complicated destiny of our people. 
Soviet policy towards religion and general public
The pattern of public attitude to the ideology is another interesting aspect reflecting on 
the relations between official policy and real situation in the society. One example is the 
case of religious attachments and the way they were expressed by public at large and by 
political establishment. As indicated above, the Soviet authorities limited religious activities 
and practices. Yet, religious practices were seen in everyday life of population not only in 
the aftermath of the establishment of the Soviet power but also throughout all periods of 
the Soviet administration of both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The Soviet administration 
emphasized the leading role of the Communist party and government elite in leading atheist 
life styles. Such attitude limited opportunities of ordinary communists to practice their 
religious beliefs and even attend celebrations and funerals of the loved ones as indicated in 
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the examples below. 
My father was communist and also the member of the local Soviet. When our 
relatives had some celebrations or when the hait celebrations were nearing, 
our father always went on some business trip to Russia or other republics. We 
always wondered why he would prefer to go on these trips during these days of 
celebrations. Apparently, he was trying to avoid these celebrations and he was 
afraid of being suspected to be religious in his beliefs. So, he would always escape 
these events. 
When our grandmother died, we could not take her to the cemetery from our 
own house because it needed to be done in a religious manner. So we had to ask 
our relatives to have our grandmother taken to the cemetery from their house. Our 
father walked in the back of the body carried by many men. But our father kept 
his hands in the back as if he was walking in the garden or on some ordinary walk. 
Later we learnt that he tried to avoid the situation when people would interpret his 
pose in a religious way and think that he was praying while walking, although in 
his heart he was praying. 
In a different case, neighbors described the case of famous Uzbek political figure, secretary of 
the Uzbek Communist Party, Rano Abdullaeva. 
Because of the prohibition of the religious rituals, people could not go to the 
rituals of people they knew and even conduct rituals of their own families. I 
recall the secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, Rano Abdullaeva who is said 
not to attend the religious funeral of her own father because she was afraid of 
repercussions.
Another interesting case was told by a different respondent who also used to be high 
ranking member in the Soviet times but later served in a high school as a teacher. His story 
shows how religious in their minds, many members of the communist party also had to 
struggle with their own beliefs in order not to have problems with their career.
When we went to Iraq as members of the Soviet delegation, we had specially 
appointed curators of the KGB who were with us for the most of the time. Before 
going there we were instructed that one of our tasks is to demonstrate how great 
the life of the former Muslims is in the Soviet south. We were all Muslims in the 
delegation except for curators. When we went to the mosque, we all stand straight 
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as if showing off that we are not praying and that we are not religious. But our 
Iraqi companions prayed and when they finished praying they loudly finished their 
prayers by saying “Prize to the Greatness of Allah” and closed their hands to their 
face and covered their face as is done in Muslim world when the prayer is finished. 
At that moment, one of members of our delegation, as a reflex, did the same. 
Our curators noticed that and that person was stripped of his position and party 
membership even before we returned back to the Soviet Union.
Because of such strict control over Communist party members and lack of tolerance 
towards their religious attachments, many people gradually turned away from Communist 
party.
My grandmother was very religious person. But my father was communist in 
his believes and therefore was atheist. Because of his influence, I also proudly 
joined pioneers’ and Komsomol youth’s communist organization. When I was 
recommended to join the communist party however, I replied that I do not deserve 
this high position. By that time, I already began feeling negatively about the 
leadership in general and about communist leadership in particular.
I knew that if I join the party, I will be required not only not to practice 
religion myself but also report on those who do so. I knew that many communists 
were on the patrolling duties in the neighborhoods of religious institutions and 
then reported to the police who is attending these institutions and weather these are 
party and government related people.
As can be concluded from the cases above, the participation in religious practices 
depended on the career and social status of a person. However, the common point was that 
many communist party and government members still attempted to attend these ceremonies 
although they had to do so in secret. Among the communist party members, there used to be 
a difference in the degree of such participation depending on how high up the person is in 
the hierarchy of the power. The higher the person is, the less frequently one attended such 
ceremonies. The lower one’s position is, the less control has been applied and the greater 
was a degree of participation. Yet all of these people did not want to be seen participating 
and did so in rush and in secret. When it comes to the ordinary citizens, the degree of their 
participation was high and they tried to follow many religious and religion-related ceremonies 
in their everyday lives as indicated in the interview below.
General public, despite strict controls of the communist party, participated and 
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conducted religious rituals. My grandfather who died in the age of 110 years old, 
used to pray five times per day until the day of his death.
People faced different situation when they had to be in multi-ethnic environment and 
when they were minority among the majority of those who did not follow religious rules and 
practices. One example was the practice of compulsory military service when youth from 
CA republics were forced to join Soviet military forces and serve their terms in the remote 
areas. It was a general practice to send those called into a military service to the areas far from 
places of their origin in order to get people acquired with different environment and get them 
prepared for the military service not only in climatic conditions of their own regions but also 
in the regions drastically different from their own. Therefore, many were sent to the Siberia 
and other parts of Russia where there was little, if any, sensitivity in respect to the religious 
belief of people. These people were served pork in their food and there were not given any 
preferential treatment as indicated below:
When I joined military service, they sent me to Voronezh, Russia. It was constantly 
very cold and we always wanted to eat. Because of such conditions, the food would 
also contain the meat, rich in fat in order to give us some energy. We were almost 
always served pork and pork-made food and many of my friends from CA would 
refrain from eating it. They eventually would catch cold and have other health-
related problems. I ate pork and I did not have a sense of guilt because I felt that I 
needed to survive in those conditions. There was no sense in talking about Muslim 
food as social and political environment in army did not presume having this kind 
of concerns. I ate and I thought in my mind that Allah will forgive me because of 
this situation. I still think I was right in my attitude.
Another case demonstrates different aspect of military service but similar attitude that 
people from CA had regarding it.
When we were called upon to serve in the military service, the control of religious 
situation in military institutions was very strict. There would be special classes 
on “political and religious maturity” in which teachers “preached” the main 
assumptions of atheism. One day the political department required us to answer a 
questioner regarding our religious attachments and affiliations. I answered in the 
way I thought questioner composers wanted me to answer. I answered that I did 
not believe in religion. Yet, as I wrote these words, I kept saying that I believed in 
Allah in my heart.
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As indicated in responses of people, there was a very clear division between their religious 
attachments and ideology. The general public had selective attitude to both, accepting the 
parts of both which served to alleviate their physical or moral concerns and problems. The 
situation of the leadership was different as governmental control over leadership’s behavior 
was stricter. This defined their attitude to religious and other norms and therefore naturally 
influenced the public perception of leadership.
4.  Trauma and political structure
As a result of the political structural changes and reforms in the economy, the essence of the 
relations between the state and the society has also changed. The attitude of the government 
and its ways of enforcing policies on the public, made deep impact on the mentality of people 
(as indicated in the accounts of people) and produced the following three outcomes.
Re-interpretation of history
The first consequence of these policies, that many events and history in general became the 
subject of re-interpretation depending on the political interests of those in power. This has 
been seen when the process of evaluating Stalin’s policies has started following his death and 
continued throughout all periods of Soviet history to the post-Soviet times. 
In the post-Soviet period, the attempts to build and spread the sense of statehood in 
the CA states led many to attempt to create histories of each post-Soviet republic with their 
own interpretation of the flow of history. This was sometimes opposed by the scholars who 
advanced the Soviet official interpretation of history. As a result, what we have in both cases 
of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan is that interpretations of various events in their history are 
dominated by the two discourses: nationalistic and Soviet creating two different poles.14 Such 
phenomenon of polarization in describing the history is not specific to the post-Soviet CA but 
can be seen in other regions of the former Soviet Union.15 The functional meaning of these 
Soviet and post-Soviet discourses serve the same functional meaning. Both were supposed to 
develop the sense of patriotism and devotion to their societies. 
Another similarity between Soviet and post-Soviet way of interpreting the past is that 
interestingly, “official” discourse of each period depicted the past in somewhat negative 
light while associating the positive developments with the current official policy which 
often confronted the regimes or policies of the past. Therefore, the “underdeveloped” pre-
Soviet past has always been contrasted to “progressive” Soviet present, when scholars used 
14 For some examples of nationalist interpretation of history, see [Yanovskaia 2008 (Nov.6)].
15 For similar situation in Caucasus, see [Garagozov 2005].
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the statistical data of 1913 to emphasize the achievements of the Soviet economy in 1980s.16
In the same manner, the achievements of the Soviet past are often downplayed by the post-
Soviet governments in CA, while achievements of post-independence years are beautified 
and often exaggerated. Partly, such attitude to history can confirm Mead’s two points about 
“creating” new pasts, namely that “new pasts are most likely to emerge during the periods of 
rapid change” and that pasts are remembered and constructed in ways that meet group needs, 
especially those associated with success.17
The Soviet description of the pre-Soviet CA has been largely dominated by the Marxist 
approach which pictured these territories as underdeveloped areas with the autocratic 
rulers and feudal values. Russian and later Turkistan revolution is then placed in a position 
of “civilizing” force in regard to the population of these areas and offering them new 
perspectives in their lives. 
Nationalist discourses, as is the case with other republics, are based on the simple 
arguments that beatify their historical roots and Soviet period as the one in which religious 
and ethnic features were denied. The appeal of the nationalist vision of the history is further 
emphasized by the emphasis of the effort to preserve “selfness” within Soviet boundaries 
which in national rhetoric is the indication of the “quite struggle” for independence.18
The public discourses on history in CA are mostly shaped by and related to everyday 
needs, experiences, identifications and mentality of people as opposed to the ideologies and 
political doctrines of each time. They are often not as polar as official discourses in their 
interpretation of history but contain positivities and negativities of each period.
Compromise
The perceptions regarding political leadership and the pattern of communications between 
public and political elite is seen as rooted in the patterns set by the Stalin’s policies and then 
continued to present day. This vision of these policies and pattern of engagement between 
elite and the public translated into an attitude of public towards political decision and 
consequently influenced the pattern of public participation in the political processes. There 
are certain patterns of public participation in the political processes that can be seen through 
the answers of respondents. 
The first pattern is perception of a special public-government relationship in which 
there is a code of conduct which both government and public accepted. The logic of this 
relationship is very simple and easily acceptable to the majority of respondents. For them, 
16 For an example of Russian perspective of positive impact of Russian colonization of Central Asia, see 
[Yanovskaia 2008 (Oct. 10)].
17 For detailed analysis of re-interpreting events, see [Schwartz et al. 1986: 150].
18 For similar abuse of historical discourses in Middle East and its comparison to Central Asia see [Cole 
and Kandiyoti 2002].
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the social order of the Soviet Union consisted of a clear division between responsibilities 
and rights between the state (government) and the society. In such structure, the state has 
primary responsibility for the provision of basic goods and services and satisfying the public 
needs. In addition, it was the state which was always retained the right to provide order and 
control the crime. It is for these aims and goals that people were prepared to bear and tolerate 
limitations of their political and human rights because their preferences lied in preserving the 
public order, political stability, which eventually translated into economic well being of the 
population. This was the primary reason, why many people accepted the situation of political 
passivism and preferred to trust and follow the judgment of political leadership of the country. 
This then connects to the third pattern of government-public relations which consisted 
of public selectivity in respect to the political and everyday life spheres in which public 
developed a loyal, yet passive attitude to the political notions and ideology and used every day 
life as the best barometer for their political and other judgments. For many, these ideas and 
notions were not the ones which guided their lives but they were regarded as some changing 
variables which could not compare to other values and norms (ethnic, religious, etc.) which 
these political initiatives aimed to change. Therefore as indicated above, political leadership 
in the country was often criticized, ridiculed and not taken seriously. People even developed 
the terminology of “kitchen conversations” to describe their critical private conversations with 
each other regarding politics. These conversations happened very often and were not suppose 
to go outside the private circle. Despite such reservations regarding political sphere, people 
at large, appreciated the positive aspects of system functioning (social welfare, economic 
benefits, security) in the society and opted to follow it.
Quiet resistance
Such lack of participation of public in the decision making resulted in the situation that many 
people accepted many decisions which they supported or at least considered acceptable and 
quietly resisted decisions that they did not accept. This resistance did not take the form of 
open challenge to the system largely because the repressions of Soviet state of past years sent 
a clear message to people to never challenge openly the political decisions. Instead people 
opted to silently resist those decisions which they believed do not serve their interests by 
either ignoring those decisions or following them to the minimum. Therefore, many decisions 
remained on the paper or were implemented only nominally just to satisfy the ambitions of 
the political establishment while in reality these decisions did not have as much functionality 
as they originally were supposed to have.
To some extent, population took the position of “observers” in the political issues and 
chose to either peacefully follow or quietly reject the majority of decisions. The position of 
the local republic elite in CA was also the same. They initiated certain programs and decisions 
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and voted for them at the republican level. Yet the final word about these programs was 
left with Moscow and it was up to elite in Moscow to decide on these issues. One political 
scientist in Uzbekistan even advanced the argument that this was a strategy of the public and 
political republican leadership not to sacrifice too much and benefit a lot from the political 
system that has been in place at the time. 
It was considered and entertained in public for some time now that Uzbekistan has 
been included into USSR forcefully and that many decisions were pushed on it. 
But I believe it was not quite so. I think the republican leadership of Uzbekistan 
deserves praise for what it did. If the Uzbek leadership openly challenged Russian 
and Soviet decisions, the power and majority of decisions in Uzbekistan would 
have been forcefully imposed on the republic. Instead, they compromised with 
Soviets by sacrificing independence of Uzbekistan they preserved republic and its 
population from massive repressions. For such obedience, Uzbekistan was given a 
very large degree of autonomy. I believe this was the biggest win in this [give and 
take game]. 
The general public also took passive position, having little interest in political decisions 
and taking very little part in majority of political events. Instead, people applied the means 
of quite resistance, as outlined above, in all spheres. In certain areas they completely relied 
on government and in others they used to behave in the way they considered to be the most 
efficient beginning with cultural and languages policies and to the religious issues.
5.  Concluding remarks
Memories of general public regarding traumatic experiences of the past can demonstrate 
themselves in several ways. Firstly, as is shown in the testimonies of people in various parts 
of this article, memories of political violence has a longer life span than that of the policies 
which produced these traumatic experiences. Therefore, more than 70 years after the various 
economic and political reform policies were implemented people still tend to recollect the 
sufferings and related experiences. 
However more importantly, these experiences also shape the public attitudes to the 
political system and the patterns of public participation. Therefore, a long history of political 
violence and repressions exemplified by economic (collectivization and agricultural reform), 
political (ethnicity-related and other) and social (religious) policies result in the lack of public 
engagement with the political decision-making. Consequently, people develop their own 
approaches to various policies and ideologies shaping their own attitudes to these primarily 
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through the lenses of applicability and efficiency of those to their everyday lives. As a result, 
people in CA developed three distinct reactive attitudes to the Stalinist era policies which can 
still be seen in their political systems and society. These are over-reliance on the state and 
political structures in main decision making without active participation in the process. When 
they see dilemmas about certain controversial policies, majority of respondents tend to seek 
compromises by accepting the policies which they consider acceptable and largely avoiding 
those which they can not accept. In the cases of the policies which are fully unacceptable, they 
do not organize meetings, political associations, advocacy of their own ideas and demonstrate 
in front of governmental offices, which would be the conventional reaction in many other 
societies. Instead, many people would apply “silent resistance,” which would demonstrate 
itself not only in the passive forms like ignoring policies but in acting in the way people 
consider “the right thing to do,” while never openly challenging the official policy.
And finally, as has been considered throughout this paper, the public memory often 
contrasts the perceptions of official historiography regarding the significance, evaluation or 
perception of certain events. In Soviet and post-Soviet times, the tradition of history-re-writing 
emphasized “correctness” of an “official history” and often downplayed the significance 
of oral sources. However, as can be seen from the testimonies, the details of the events and 
reasons for historical evaluations can hardly be understood without taking into account the 
recollection of the past made by ordinary people. It is especially so with those in the older age 
group, whose memories can be lost forever, if they are not recorded and archived while these 
people are still alive.
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